Abstract. There would seem to be a natural connection between graphs and information security. This is particularly so in the arena of access control and authorization. Research on applying graph theory to access control problems goes back almost three decades. Nevertheless it is yet to make its way into the mainstream of access control research and practice. Much of this prior research is based on first principles, although more recently there have been significant efforts to build upon existing graph theory results and approaches. This paper gives a perspective on some of the connections between graphs and their transformations and access control models, particularly with respect to the safety problem and dynamic role hierarchies.
Introduction
In concept there appears to be a strong potential for graphs and their transformations to be applied to information security problems. In practice, however, this potential largely remains to be realized. Applications of graph theory in the security domain go back almost three decades and there has been a steady trickle of papers exploring this potential. Nonetheless graph theory has yet to make its way into the mainstream of security research and practice. In part this may be due to the relative youth of the security discipline and the particular focus of the research community in the early years. Because of the versatility of graph representations and graph theory techniques perhaps it is only a matter of time before a strong and compelling connection is found.
Information security is a broad field and offers multiple avenues for application of graph theory. To pick just two examples, in recent years we have seen application of graph theory in penetration testing and vulnerability analysis [2, 7, 17, 20, 29] and in authentication metrics [21] . It is beyond the scope of this paper to consider the vast landscape of information security. Rather we will focus on the specific area of access control and authorization.
We begin with a brief review of access control and access control models, and then identify two specific problems of access control where graph theory has been employed in the past. These are the so-called safety problem and the problem of dynamic hierarchies. The rest of the paper explores past work in these two problem areas in some detail and concludes with a brief discussion of possible future research.
Access Control
Access control is concerned with the question of who can do what in a computer system. Clearly the same object (such as a file) may be accessible by different users in different ways. Some users may be able to read and write the file, others to just read it and still others who have no access to the file. Strictly speaking users do not manipulate files directly but rather do so via programs (such as a text editor or word processor). A program executing on behalf of a user is called a subject, so access control is concerned with enforcing authorized access of subjects to objects. This basic idea was introduced by Lampson in a classic paper [14] and continues to be the central abstraction of access control. Authorization in Lampson's access matrix model is determined by access rights (such as r for read and w for write) in the cells of an access matrix. An example of an access matrix is shown in figure 1 . Here subject U can read and write file F but only read file G. Subject V can read and write file G but has no access to file F. A review of the essential concepts of access control is available in [25] . The access matrix of figure 1 can be easily depicted as a directed graph with labelled edges as shown in figure 2 . Thereby the intuitive feeling that there is a strong connection between graphs and access control. For convenience, we will henceforth talk of the access matrix and access graph as equivalent notions.
Access Control Models
A static access graph is not very interesting. Real computer systems are highly dynamic in that the access rights of subjects to objects change over time and new subjects and objects (and thereby new rights) are created and existing ones deleted. In terms of the access matrix this means that not only can contents of existing cells be changed but new rows and columns can be created and existing ones destroyed. In terms of the access graph, in addition to edge adding and deleting operations new nodes can be created and existing ones deleted.
An access control model specifies the operations by which the access graph can be changed. These operations are typically authorized by existing rights in the access graph itself. A common example of this is the "own" right shown in figure 3 . The owner of a file has the own right for it and can add and delete rights for that file at the owner's free discretion. Thus subjects U and V control the rights of all subjects to files F and G respectively, i.e., U and V control the addition and deletion of edges labelled r or w terminating in F and G respectively.
The policy of owner-based discretionary access control is certainly reasonable but researchers quickly realized that there are many other policies of practical interest. For example, can the "own" right itself be granted? Some systems do not allow this. The creator of a file becomes its owner and remains its owner thereafter. Other systems allow ownership to be propagated from one subject to another. Some of these allow multiple simultaneous ownership, while other allow only one owner at a time. There does not appear to be any single policy that will be universally applicable. Hence the need for flexible access control models in this regard.
The Safety Problem
In a seminal paper Harrison, Ruzzo and Ullman [8] proposed a simple language for stating the rules by which an access graph can be changed. The resulting model is often called HRU. They then posed the safety problem as follows 1 .
Given an initial access graph and a fixed set of rules for making authorized changes to it, is it possible to reach an access graph in which subject X has α right to object Y (i.e., there is an edge labelled α from X to Y)?
It turns out that safety is undecidable in the HRU model. Surprisingly the quest to find useful models with efficiently decidable safety proved to be quite challenging. Although significant positive results have appeared over the years, a appropriate balance between safety and flexibility remains a challenge for access control models. The role of graph theory in progress on the safety problem is discussed in section 2.
Dynamic Hierarchies
Most practical access control systems go beyond the simple access graph we have discussed to provide a role (or group) construct. Thus subjects not only get the rights that they individually are granted but also acquire rights granted to roles (or groups) that they are a member of. For example, figure 4 shows an access graph in which subject U is a member of role G which in turn has the rights r and w for file F. Thereby U is authorized to read and write file F 2 . Roles are a powerful concept in aggregating permissions and simplifying their administration [5, 26] . Modern access control systems are typically role-based because of the power and flexibility of this approach. Roles are often organized into hierarchies as shown, for example, in figure 5. This is a Hasse diagram of a partial order where senior roles are shown towards the top and junior ones towards the bottom. The Supervising Engineer role inherits all permissions of its junior roles, thus this role can do everything that the junior roles can do plus more. Conversely, a user who is a member of a senior role is also considered to be a member of the junior roles. In other words permissions are inherited upwards in the hierarchy and membership is inherited downwards. In practice role hierarchies need to change and evolve over time. How to do this effectively is a challenging problem for role administration. The application of graph transformations in progress on this issue is discussed in section 3. 
Graphs and the Safety Problem
The take-grant model of Lipton and Snyder [15] is among the earliest applications of graph theory to access control. This model was developed in reaction to the undecidable safety results of the HRU model. It takes its name from the two rights it introduces, t for take and g for grant. The depiction of these two rights in the access graph is shown in figure 6 . The notation B/t∈dom(A) denotes the possession of the B/t capability in the A's domain, and is equivalent to stating that t∈[A,B] cell of the access matrix. Similarly for B/g∈dom(A). The take right in figure 6 (a) enables any right that B has to be copied to A. That is any edge originating at B can be duplicated with the same label and termination node but originating at A. The grant right in figure 6 (b) conversely enables any right that A has to be copied to B. That is any edge originating at A can be duplicated with the same label and termination node but originating at B. Somewhat surprisingly it turns out that the flow of rights in the take-grant model is symmetric. This allows for efficient safety analysis in the model but severely limits its expressive power. The original formulation of the take-grant model depicted the take and grant rights in the access graph as shown in figure 6. Lockman and Minsky [16] observed that a slightly different graph representation would demonstrate the symmetry of take-grant much more easily. They proposed to represent the ability for rights to flow from A to B by a directed edge from A to B labelled can-flow. The two situations of figure 6 are respectively shown in figure 7 in this modified representation. The focus of this representation is on the flow of rights rather than on the underlying right that enables the flow. To complete description of the take-grant model we show the create operation shown in figure 8 using both styles of representation 3 . This diagram shows the 4 . I came across these constructions during my doctoral research. I believe they demonstrate a fundamental truth. Graph representations are flexible and it is important to capture the correct properties in the edges and nodes of the graph. My subsequent work on the safety problem resulted in a number of models [1, 22, 24] . Some elements of graph theory are used in the analysis of these models but there is a probably a stronger tie with existing graph theory results. So there is potential for exploring a deeper connection here. Based on the discussion above much will depend upon a suitable representation of the access control problem in graph edges and nodes. Jaeger and Tidswell [6] have used graph notation to capture constraints and argue that this approach may lead to practical safety results. Nyanchama and Osborn have also discussed the representation of conflict of interest policies in their role-graph model [18] . Also recently Koch et al [9] [10] [11] [12] have developed safety results directly based on the theory of graph transformations. Reconciliation of these results with the known safety results for access control models would be a step forward in understanding the insights that graphs and their transformations can provide in this domain.
Graphs and Dynamic Hierarchies
The use of role (or group) hierarchies in access control has a long history and considerable motivation for simplifying management of rights. The current commercial success of role-based access control products that support hierarchies is testimony to this fact. Mathematically a hierarchy is a partial order, that is a reflexive, transitive and anti-symmetric binary relation on roles. In this section we briefly look at two lines of research dealing with dynamic hierarchies for access control.
A particular kind of hierarchy called an ntree was introduced by this author [23] . The ntree has some very appealing properties for access control including the fact that it is a dimension 2 partial order, so it can be represented as the intersection of two linear orders. This allows us to label each node n with a pair of natural numbers l(n) and r(n), such that u<v if and only if l(u)<l(v) and r(u)<r(v). The ntree also has a recursive definition based on refining an existing node into another ntree, with the base case being a forest of trees and inverted trees. There are efficient algorithms for recognizing whether or not a given hierarchy is an ntree. One of the open questions regarding ntrees is how to recognize hierarchies that are close to being ntrees and could benefit from a ntree representation augmented with some additional information. More generally research on hierarchies with special properties that are attractive for access control can be pursued.
The need for dynamic role hierarchies as part of the administration of rolebased access control (RBAC) is motivated in the ARBAC97 model [27] . The fundamental question is how to allow localized evolution of a hierarchy without disrupting larger global relationships. The authors of ARBAC97 suggest the notion of an encapsulated range as the basis for determining a suitable unit for local modifications. Crampton and Loizou [3, 4] point out some problems with this notion and propose a mathematically better founded notion of administrative scope. Koch et al [13] discuss administrative scope in their graph-based approach to access control and provide an operational semantics for it. The issue of evolving hierarchies and reconciling pre-existing hierarchies is likely to grow in importance as enterprises deploy RBAC across multiple business units and business partners.
Conclusion
In this paper we have briefly explored the connection between graphs and access control models, focusing on the safety problem and on dynamic role hierarchies. There is a long history of attempts to apply graph theory to these problems. Much of the earlier work is based on first principles. In recent years we have seen a more direct application of graph theory results. There is strong potential in further exploring this connection.
The area of access control and authorization has had a resurgence of interest in recent years. Although the access matrix model has served as a reasonable foundation for access control research and practice it has become considerably dated. With the Internet explosion many new forms of access control are being deployed in various e-commerce scenarios. There is increasing realization that the foundations of access control need a deeper and richer model. A number of authors have proposed various extensions to traditional access control. Park and Sandhu [19, 28] recently proposed a unified model for next generation access control called usage control or UCON. Initial efforts to formalize this model have taken a logic-based approach [30] . It would be interesting to see how graphs and their transformations can be applied to UCON models. The framework of UCON is very rich so there is likely to be some aspect of UCON that can benefit from a graph-based formal foundation.
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